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ABSTRACT: The paper brings existential temporality, as developed in the work of 
phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Husserl, into dialogue with historical 
materialism. What results is the development of a theoretical background for what the author 
terms futural materialism, which is taken to be a complimentary logical extension of historical 
materialist projects. To this end, it is suggested that the past and the future are best understood 
as materially existing in the present in an immanent way, mediated by conscious beings in the 
form of memory, projection, residual effect, and affect. Put differently, the present's presence 
in the past and future play a determining roll in those temporal dimensions, which 
subsequently fold back into the configuration of the present. Following Nietzsche and drawing 
influence from Guattari and Deleuze, it is argued that past and future are relatively fluid tools 
to be purposively deployed in the present for particular purposes rather than being 
transcendent facts which subjectivity must merely contend with. It is further asserted that as 
part of a broader non-reductive material monist project of social transformation, both futural 
and historical materialism are necessary considerations.    
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Futural materialism is not a theory or position which seeks to compete with or deny 
historical materialism, nor is it a position which seeks to draw attention to the 
importance of planning or care for the future, as one might initially think. Rather, it is 
complimentary to historical materialism and merely seeks to extend and refine the 
logics of this body of knowledge by suggesting that the future and past are equally 
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materially present in the present, or equally absent. The suggestion then, is that if 
there is a historical material connection from the past to the present and the present 
to the future, so too is there a material connection from the future to the present and 
from the present to the past – the arrows of causation point both ways. Put differently, 
it is suggested here that the past and the future materially bear upon the present in 
much the same way because the present bears upon them in similar ways. Such an 
understanding of temporality more fully acknowledges the various fields of possibility 
that open before (and behind) being or subjectivity in each present moment, 
rendering the possibilities within those fields more immediately realizable. It is in this 
way that the enactive futural dimension enriches the transformative possibilities of 
historical materialism. Moreover, just as we must be cautious when it comes to using 
and abusing history for life, as Nietzsche (2010) would warn, we must also be cautious 
of the ways in which we use and abuse the future for life. Futural materialism is firmly 
grounded in philosophical material monism in that there is a commitment to the idea 
that anything one speaks of is, in some way or another, material and is located in a 
relative position within spacetime, though this is a point historical materialists might 
contest. It should be noted that the material monism underlying the work here is a 
nonreductive one grounded in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty and bearing similarities to the neurophenomenology of Francisco 
Verela (1991) or what we might call the neo-emergentis non-reductive physicalism of 
Evan Thompson (2007). Put briefly, this version of non-reductive material monism 
holds that in complex dynamic systems, 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts' 
in that what emerges from constitutive parts is not reducible to them and the 
part/whole division is one of co-constitution and mutual causation.1 In what follows, 
the theoretical background for futural materialism is laid out. What remains for a 
future project is to deploy this more concretely in methodologies and practices which 
seek social transformation, especially in relation to historical materialist projects.  
As human beings, as beings highly capable of copious amounts of self-induced 
reterritorialization, as Deleuze and Guattari (1983, especially p.273f) would note, there 
is a way that time can be understood which corresponds to a mode of being that is 
conducive to social transformations and creative affirmation: existential or 
phenomenological temporality. Existential temporality is not necessarily non-linear. 
Time is still understood roughly as a movement of present, future, and past, but this 
movement is understood as a movement throughout the entire length of the moment 
or life in question (Merleau-Ponty, p.419, 1967). That is to say, every 'event', including 
those events which are past and future, shifts and alters as (space)time moves. The 
                                                          
1 See Thompson (2007) for a detailed explanation of this. Especially Chapter 3 “Autonomy and 
Emergence” and Appendix 2 “Emergence and the Problem of Downward Causation” 
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past does not become an unalterable, objective, and static, fact bearing on the present 
and the future is not an open field of possibilities which does not bear upon the 
present or the past. On the contrary, they both move and shift or are sketched2 and 
resketched by the present being who interacts with them, always with the flavour of a 
new situation. The present possesses a certain presence in both past and future. 
Moreover, the present plays a causal role in them through active and passive 
interpretation and interaction. To put this another way, conscious agents3 may 
reterritorialize the events of their past and future. It is in this sense that the past and 
future are always “present in the world” Merleau-Ponty, p.412, 1967) or “ready-to-
hand” (Heidegger, §69, 1962, Merleau-Ponty, p.416, 1967). Recalled pasts and 
projected futures are tools to be used by present being and without conscious beings, 
past and future can hardly, or perhaps not at all, be said to exist. Like Heidegger's 
hammer, 'the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our 
relationship become and the more it is encountered unveiledly as that which it is – as 
equipment.' (1962, §69). As conscious beings it makes little sense to always equate our 
experience of temporality with the linear temporal ordering we project onto mere 
objects (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p.412), a projection useful in certain situations but not 
in all situations. As far as we know a rock cannot interact with its past and future, 
human beings can. There is debate surrounding how far one must take such 
arguments. Biologist Robert Lanza and astronomer Bob Berman (2009) take a 
somewhat radical position by suggesting that consciousness is a foundation for reality 
and the cosmos, while Gramsci (1992, see especially “On the So-called Existence of 
the External World”) simply suggests that, at least epistemologically, any objective 
fact, say a chip on a rock from a past collision, is at best 'universally subjective' (p.446), 
which is to say objective only relative to temporally ('historically') situated conscious 
beings. A debate may be had regarding whether one must commit to some version of 
Lanza and Berman's ontological/cosmological argument or something resembling 
Gramsci's more epistemological argument. Regardless, under the traditional linear 
conception of time, the past bears on the present and the present bears on the future. 
Each possesses a certain presence in that which follows. In the existential conception 
of time, the past and future exist through the present, which possesses a presence in 
both future and past. Insofar as this is the case, the past and future may be 
dynamically interacted with, or not, in various ways according to the material 
                                                          
2 Merleau-Ponty uses Husserl's term “Abschattungen” for this. See Phenomenology of Perception. p.417f 
3 NB: the definition of consciousness and debates around what counts as conscious is quite contentions 
and beyond the scope of the present work. I would accept a very broad definition of consciousness. 
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conditions one wishes to presently actualize within certain fields of possibilities. One 
may use the hammer for carpentry, but one may also use it as a weapon, to crack 
nuts, to weigh down paper, to prop open a window or any number of other novel uses 
in situation, again within certain fields of possibility (it would be difficult to use a 
hammer to fly to the moon). The hammer was designed with a certain form and with 
purpose, but we may reterritorialize it by using it to actualize different events or 
phenomena. The same can be said of the past (or the future). What has and will 
happen may be 'fact' but the reactualization of these events (or pre-actualization as is 
the case of the future) in the present is, to a large degree, determined by the present 
being through their ability to use the events in question in various ways. In this sense, 
no matter how 'real' or 'factual' a past (or future) event may be, its causal efficacy on 
the present being is ambiguous in character. The past, like the hammer, is determined 
but its effects within the present are largely determined by the attitude of the 
conscious being. To begin to grasp existential temporality more fully, it will be helpful 
to look at its structure. 
Perhaps one of the best articulations of the 'structure' of existential temporality is 
the one offered by Merleau-Ponty (1967). He elucidates his understanding of time by 
drawing from the work of Husserl (p.416). The idea in its most basic form is that past 
events are, as noted above, always observed from a present. Insofar as the present is a 
different 'position' than the original moment being accessed in memory, the past has 
necessarily been changed, hence Merleau-Ponty's assertion that time moves along its 
entirety. At the very least the past is being 'observed' from a different point of view, in 
some cases it has been altered by misattribution, manipulation or delusion. This is a 
fairly well documented fact in psychology (Lindsay & Johnson 1989., Zaragoza & 
Lane, 1994., Read, 1996.). Everything that is remembered (or expected) is always 
already slightly altered by the fact that it is being reconstituted or preconstituted from 
an instant in which it does not exist in an unmediated fashion and through which it 
interacts with a different set events and different present situations (Merleau-Ponty, 
1967, p.416). Like Heraclitus' river (Plato, 1998, 402a), one can never remember or 
project the same way twice. Borrowing from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty provides a 
diagram outlining what existential time might 'look' like, a slightly altered version of 


















Fig. 1: Existential Temporality adds 'depth' to the linear 
understanding of time. NB: the causal arrows and the 
diagonal lines 'above' the line ABC have been 
added.Merleau-Ponty notes that to be complete Husserl's 
diagram the lines above (indicating futural projections) 
should be added and the causal lines are implied by his 
text. 
In moving from event A to event B, event A, for the conscious observer, shifts to 
become A' because it is now being observed from a new position which necessarily 
alters it, however slightly the alteration may be. The same phenomenon occurs with 
projection of the future. Event B*, as projected from A becomes B when actualized 
and shifts again to become B' upon reaching event C, at which point A' shifts again to 
become A''. It should be noted that the events A, B and C are not denied their 
material existence as real events and there is still a causal chain running from the past 
to the present and future. However, as new events occur the past and future ones can 
no longer be accessed by the conscious agent in their initial form – their material 
condition is one which exists as memory or projection, residual effect and, 
importantly, affect – they exist only in a state of transient but immanent mediation. In 
this sense we must say that the past and the future are similar in many ways in terms 
of their material existence. Strictly speaking, neither have an independent material 
existence in the present because their existence is dependent on beings capable of 
experiencing effect and/or affect. One might even go so far as to say that 
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documenting something in the form of a picture or video does not suffice to perfectly 
preserve a given moment or event because the picture will always be viewed from a 
different moment and thus will be given a different shading, no matter how subtle 
that shading might be. The 'arrows' of causation in figure 1 are my addition to this 
depiction of temporality. Without them it might be concluded that Merleau-Ponty is 
providing a description of how memories perhaps fade or are psychologically altered 
depending on temporal distance. What I have in mind, as Merleau-Ponty's text seems 
to suggests, is much more enactive. The primes and the asterisks are, in a sense, 
inevitable but they also indicate the possibility for conscious interaction with and 
active alteration of the past. A given being at event B must 'reach through a thin layer 
of time' (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p.416) to access or retain what has happened or will 
happen. This action of reaching and the shading applied by the present being changes 
how the event A or C will affect them and is connected to intentionality, both in the 
philosophical sense of 'directedness' (Brentano, 1973) and in the more mundane sense 
in which intentional actions are ones involving choice between alternatives, though 
the latter is not always the case. This is why the arrows of causation run in both 
directions on the diagonal lines.  
To be sure, the past plays a determining role in the present, but the present also 
plays a determining role in the past by both calling it forth (recalling) and colouring 
the interaction. As noted by one literary critic, 'the conscious present is an awareness 
of the past in a way and to an extent which the past’s awareness of itself cannot show' 
and furthermore the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is 
directed by the past (T.S. Elliot, 1960, Sec.1). To be clear, the suggestion here is not 
that we should become historical revisionists. Rather, it is that we are already 
historical and futural revisionists – the point is to always ask why we call forth a past 
or summon a future and what purposes such activities serve.  
While it is certainly true that human psychology plays a large role in the 
alteration of past events by the present observer, what is most compelling 
philosophically is the malleability of how an event is remembered and how a being 
may actively constitute the style of the interaction. It is true that one may not change 
the 'facts' of past events or even the 'facts' of future events,4but the style with which 
one carries them forth and how these facts are put to use in the present moment are 
largely open. In speaking generally of his own existence, Merleau-Ponty notes that he 
is 'the absolute source... [and that his existence] does not stem from [its] antecedents, 
from [its] physical or social environment; instead it moves out toward them and 
                                                          
4  Again, the extensive debate around determinism is beyond the scope of the present work. 
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sustains them, for [he] alone bring[s] into being...the tradition which [he] elects to 
carry on...' (1967, p.ix). The same can be said of one's past and future. Events are not 
burdensome externalities which the being simply must come to accept. They are part 
of the being's 'field of presence', as Merleau-Ponty might say, and they are open to 
interaction in whichever way the being decides is useful. Every present is a situation 
where the given being exists in the presence of Sartrean facticity, the concrete 
material conditions of the present, but this matters little when it comes to the being's 
ability to choose how they will engage with the 'facts' of the situation, what pasts and 
futures they call forth aid (or hinder) them, and how they will use those pasts and 
futures. In a sense there is a “nothingness” which separates the given being in the 
current situation from the situations of the past and future, but this nothingness is not 
a direct causal link so much as a responsibility for what they do with their past and 
future in the present moment (See Sartre, 1956, p.68f). The important point here is 
that from any given present, the conscious being may both select which past events 
(and future projections) to engage with (a more or less free choice), but more 
importantly they may choose how they engage with the chosen events. Both of these 
choices colour the event or events focused in on, which in turn shape the being's 
present dynamic interaction with it's Lebenswelt. In this way the human present is 
always a dynamic co-emergence of past, present, and future since each bears upon the 
other. Certainly the past bears on the present but never before the present bears on 
the past, while both past and future collapse into a fleeting present. Conscious beings 
reach into their past and future, their 'field of presence', with 'lines of intentionality' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p.416). This interaction with past and future is a way of actively 
shaping the events of a life, a situation, a socious and so on. It might be helpful to 
think of feedback loops. The individual is situated in a present from which they 
project the events of the future and remember events of the past. The manner in 
which these events are projected and remembered produces feedback which help to 
determine the effect the events have on the being in the present situation. For 
Nietzsche, actively 'willing' the way one interacts with a particular event of the past is 
called 'willing backwards'. To do this is to engage with the 'will as creator' which 
converts the past from mere, uncontrollable 'dreadful accident[s]' to affirmations of 
life as a life (1995, p249f and p.308f). This type of indiscriminate affirmation 
amoralizes 'good' and 'bad' past (and future) events, making them all capable of 
becoming affirmations or celebrations of the present life (Nietzsche, 1995, p.435f).  
Another visual representation of existential temporality will help to clarify this. 
Figure 2 depicts existential temporality as experienced by a being in a situation.  
 









Fig. 2: Pure Existential Temporality 
Figure 2 depicts a being (red circle) in their field of presence at a given moment of 
'frozen' time where the historical and futural fields 'collapse' on the present through 
purposive intentionality. It should be noted that this is a dynamic model of time and 
the diagram would be more instructive if it was interactive. Ideally the black spirals 
would be spinning and they would fade in and out in different positions along with 
the red lines as the red circle moved 'forward'. In fact, this diagram can be taken as a 
slightly different expression of Deleuze and Guattari's plane of immanence, 
specifically the social strata (1987, Ch.3). Likewise, it may help to think of the 
temporal dimension of being as a zone of deterritorialization or site of potential 
breakthrough (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p.280f). In any case, as the circle moves 
'forward' the futural field collapses into specific material conditions when met by the 
circle and the field of the past expands once the circle has moved away from it. Both 
the past and future fields continue to open up at their ends making each of the blue 
'points' which constitute them available for use by the present being. The blue shaded 
fields of historical and futural presence narrow the closer they are to the being to 
indicate the fact that particular material conditions are rendered more immediately 
viable, verifiable, or imaginable, the closer they are to presently actualized material 
conditions. The black spirals indicate past and future events which the individual has 
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chosen, consciously or otherwise, to focus on or draw forth for use in the present 
situation. The use of spirals is intentional as this better indicates that the moments are 
not static and can be viewed and interacted with in various ways. The strait red lines 
are lines of intentionality being cast by the agent into the past and future with the goal 
of (p)recapturing the moments of choice. The curved red lines are the feedback lines 
which carry the effects of the interpretation of the events back to the individual for 
them to interact with. The temporal fields are very similar to the plain of immanence 
in that they are virtualities which may or may not be actualized in a present moment 
and, as noted, the 'closer' the get to the conscious being in its actual(ized) material 
conditions, the more viable they become as conditions to be actualized in the present. 
The present moment, where the temporal fields are collapsed, is directly experienced 
in the same way that B is directly experienced when a being is in that moment, as in 
figure 1. We might then say that event A is located somewhere in the past temporal 
field. However, due to the nature of existential time A cannot be 'directly' experienced 
as A since that moment and it's direct material conditions are no longer present, the 
same might be said of C in the futural field. If we were to locate event A in the field 
and draw a vertical line, this line would indicate all of the possible ways that the 
original event A can be interacted with in the present moment (this would of course 
exclude A proper, since again those material conditions no longer exist in an 
unmediated way). In other words, the line would be the entire set of A to the power of 
x excluding A. At any given present moment the being casts numerous lines of 
intentionality which aid the action at hand in the present situation. It must be stressed 
once again that there is no immaterial or transcendental aspect to this understanding 
of temporality. Futures and pasts exist materially, though in a mediated way, as 
memory, projection, residual effect, and affect.       
It is interesting to note that a typical linguistic metaphor used to describe time is 
that the past is 'behind' us and the future is before or 'in front' of us (Núñez & 
Sweetser, 2006, p.402). This metaphor fits well with the linear understanding of 
temporality. That which has happened is relatively passed by and somewhat 
untouchable, finished, or over. The past, considered this way, is baggage that one 
drags behind them, corpses of moments that were, always weighing on the present 
and fixedly determining its material conditions. At best the observer that is moving 
'forward' through time can occasionally glance back over their shoulder to see what is 
there weighing on them. In historical materialist terms, the past material conditions 
heavily figure into the present material conditions. Furthermore the notion that the 
future lies ahead suggests that it is somehow more open to being freely shaped. The 
future is an open path and the agent has at least some relative choice as to their 
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direction within the confines of existent material conditions. One can see the horizon 
with anticipation of their future interactions and mold them accordingly, usually with 
certain limitations dictated by the past and present. This linguistic metaphor is 
considered to be 'more or less cross-culturally universal' (Núñez & Sweetster, 2006, 
p.401). However, in the Aymara language spoken in parts of South America the 
metaphor appears to be reversed: the future is described as behind and the past in 
front or ahead (Núñez & Sweester, 2006, p.402). Another observer notes that speakers 
of this language might use the metaphor this way because the past can be “seen” 
much more clearly whereas the future possesses a higher degree of uncertainty and 
cannot be “viewed” as clearly (Santiago et.al. 2007, p.512). This way of describing 
time is useful in terms of existential temporality because under this framework the 
past is taken to be somewhat more ready-to-hand. I can more readily and creatively 
use a hammer that sits before me than I can one which is somewhere in the distance 
behind me and is thus largely not visible. It is in this sense that the past, while more 
certain than the future is also, in some respects, less determinant than it. It can be 
used much more readily and thus in many more ways than the future can. The 
future, however, is not necessarily more unknown than the past. The difference is that 
as they move through (space)time, a given being will arrive in a present that was once 
a future and be able to compare the emergent material conditions to those of the 
expected future in the experienced past, though as noted the past will have necessarily 
shifted given the movement of existential temporality. A bias emerges, at least within 
a given life and perhaps with the aid of recorded history, such that we generally 
ascribe a heavier weight to the reality of the past than the future because we think we 
can accurately compare what we though the future would be like with what the future 
became once it emerged as a present. However, this implicitly presumes that the 
projections of the future did not impact the emergence of the future as present. To 
compare expectations of the future with what becomes of the future once it is present 
is to ignore the causal role of the expectations and disregard the shading given to the 
future in the past present as well as the feedback shading provided to the past present 
by those expectations, which in turn constitutes the emerging present. Moreover, 
neither past nor future exist in a material way except through mediation with present 
beings, thus there is little reason to prioritize the efficacy and material reality of one 
over the other. In this sense the past is almost more indeterminate than the future  or 
perhaps they are equally determinate. No amount of planning and prudence can 
account for the contingencies of that which has not yet happened. In a sense the 
contingency of the future is beyond the grasp of the individual. With regards to the 
past, the attitude taken up by the present being is contingency. The determination of 
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the attitude is the shading added to the past from the present by the agent and this 
must be accounted for, if not actively engaged with in projects which seek some form 
of active transformation within the present.  
Much of what has been said regarding existential temporality already illustrates 
some of the modes of life which open up from understanding time in this way. First 
and foremost it frees the given being and more generally the socio-political grouping 
from their past as a burden by granting them a causal role in how past events shape 
present moments beyond mere (over)determination from past and present material 
conditions. This type of freedom from one's past is not all that novel. As previously 
stated it is a foundational element of Sartre's doctrine of freedom and responsibility 
(see 1956, p.66f.) and fits well with Nietzsche's concept of 'amor fati' or love of one's 
fate (see Thiele, 1990).  In short, existential temporality is a mode of understanding 
lived time which is conducive to a more robust use of desire in the creation of 
different material conditions within the present.  
 To be certain, it is difficult to accept that the past and future exist materially 
only through various forms of mediation because this involves a high degree of 
responsibility placed on beings in the present. It is much easier to issue excuses when 
we are overdetermined by past material conditions rather than, as Marx notes, being 
free to create but not in material conditions of our choice (1963, p.1). The 
responsibility becomes heavier yet since being is equipped with an extensive arsenal of 
historical and futural conditions that may be intentionally deployed for the use or 
abuse of life within the present. Nietzsche is quite critical of relying too heavily on the 
mode of living which uses the past as an excuse since it is a 'reactive form of life' 
which merely 'submits' to the 'burdens' of evaluations which are given by the past or 
those beings of the past; it is to be restricted to the reactive dialectical mode of living 
(See Deleuze, 2001, p.71).For Nietzsche this is the sickness of modern society, that it 'is 
the triumph of “reaction” over active life and of negation over affirmative thought.' 
(Deleuze, 2001, p.68). It is to treat our past and the pasts of others as though they are 
absolute truth severed from the purpose and situation they serve. A transcendental 
past (or future) is a self-alienation where human being creates something powerful 
and then obeys is as though it is something above and beyond its origin.  It is a form 
of historocentrism which focuses on the recreation of past modes of thought and past 
modes of living rather than on creating new modes of thought and life. This was 
precisely what the Russian Futurists rejected: the unreflexive imposition of the past on 
the present. It is perhaps the worst type of tyranny, the tyranny of history or more 
briefly historocentrism. Human beings are thrown into a world which is largely 
beyond their control and their freedom to live creatively by manipulating, accepting, 
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revising, and rejecting, established orders at will in any given situation is partially 
taken away by a propensity to obsess over the past as though it transcends the present, 
when in fact it is mediated by it an thus only immanent within it. Recall Deleuze's 
contention that the history of philosophy has played the repressor's role by 
intimidating and burdening would-be philosophers, hopeful to create new modes of 
thought and life (2001, p.65f). Certainly it is beneficial to sometimes engage with 
tradition, but this engagement must be interactive to facilitate the wondrous ability of 
being to create or deterritorialize. It is not difficult to see why the Russian Futurists 
were so eager to 'throw the established doctrines overboard to make way for new 
ones.'(Burliuk et.al. 1917). Rigid historocentrism, relying on the past (often via 
attachment to traditions) is, at least in part, what allows for the perpetuation of 
classism, racism, sexism, religious conflict and in general the hindrance of creating 
new modes of living. In short it is a barrier to personal and societal rhizomatic 
growth. To go as far as the Russian Futurists is to go too far. Privileging the future is a 
mistake. It is also mere reaction and an attempt to negate something, namely the past. 
This is precisely why existential temporality is quite useful. It allows the past and 
future to coexist with the present as tools to be creatively used to actualize potential 
events. Hence the contention that futural materialism is best understood as a 
complimentary component of a broader approach which includes historical 
materialism. It should also be noted that the claim here is not that existential 
temporality will eradicate the aforementioned social ills or provide a 'better' way to 
live. It simply facilitates a mode of thinking and living which is more conducive to 
creating ever more modes of thought and life rather than constantly trying to cling to 
that which has been.   
 Existential temporality does not privilege the past as something unalterable 
which merely limits current and future action by determining current material 
conditions. Rather, it considers past (and future) events to be tools for use in the 
present situation, tools which may be used in any number of ways. One may 
creatively select which past experiences to call forth and how to interact with them 
and combine these with imagined futures and presents to generate countless new 
modes of living. It is worth noting once more that what is being suggested here is that 
utilization of one past or one future in a present moment does not require the being 
or beings to always rely on the past or future or to always use it in the same way. 
Insofar as we freely use our pasts and our futures in novel ways rather than be 
dominated and constrained by them, we are able to live creatively by affirming the 
pasts, the futures, and our lives in general as collapses of mediated and immanent 
futures and pasts. This understanding of temporality is conducive to a more 
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deterritorialized socious and should be considered in projects which seek to utilize 
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